



**S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20331126**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
**HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO**  
**U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA**  
**APO AE 09360**



JTF-GTMO-CDR

26 November 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,  
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo  
Detainee, ISN US9AF-001008DP (S)

**JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment**

**1. (S//NF) Personal Information:**

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Mohammed Mustafa Sahil
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Mohammad Mustafa Sohail Bahazada, Farid
- Place of Birth: Jalalabad, Afghanistan (AF)
- Date of Birth: 15 April 1980
- Citizenship: Afghanistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-001008DP



**2. (U//FOUO) Health:** Detainee is in overall good health.

**3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:**

**a. (S) Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention (CD) on 20 June 2007.

**b. (S//NF) Executive Summary:** *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would possibly seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has been mostly compliant with guard force personnel. Detainee has responded cooperatively in the past but is currently non-cooperative and may be withholding information of intelligence value. Detainee's reluctance to cooperate may show his continued support for extremist group. Detainee is*

**CLASSIFIED BY:** MULTIPLE SOURCES  
**REASON:** E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)  
**DECLASSIFY ON:** 20331126

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possibly a member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG).<sup>1</sup> Detainee was an accomplice in an April 2003 HIG plan to use a car bomb to attack the Afghan Presidential Compound and the US Embassy in Kabul, AF. The intent of the attack was to assassinate both the Afghan President and the US Ambassador. Detainee collected intelligence on the Afghan Presidential Compound and the US Embassy to support the operation. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **LOW** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **LOW** intelligence value

c. (S//NF) **Summary of Changes:** The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation.

- Detainee is now recommended for transfer based on a reevaluation of his threat level and intelligence value

#### 4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

**The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.**

a. (S//NF) **Prior History:** Detainee is an ethnic Tajik born and raised in Jalalabad. In approximately 1991, detainee's family moved to the neighborhood of Shah Shahied near the Masjed Itifaq Mosque in Kabul. Soon after the Afghan civil war began in 1992, detainee's family moved back to Jalalabad. In 1992, detainee attended one year of English lessons at the International Rescue Committee (IRC). In 1996, detainee received typing and basic computer training from two small computer training companies. In 1998, detainee graduated from high school in Jalalabad. Upon graduation, detainee opened his own small computer transcription business in Jalalabad. In 2000, a competing computer store informed Taliban authorities that detainee was renting movies out of his business, which was against Taliban law. The Taliban religious police arrested detainee and held him for twelve days.<sup>2</sup> Detainee's resume indicates he was a student at the CMI Computer College in Peshawar,

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<sup>1</sup> Analyst Note: HIG is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) Priority 2 counterterrorism (CT) target. Priority 2 CT targets are defined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism, or countries that have state organizations involved in terrorism that have *demonstrated both intention and capability* to attack US persons or interests, as well as areas containing safe havens for Priority 2 terrorist groups.

<sup>2</sup> 001008 FM40 22-FEB-2005

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Pakistan (PK) from 1999 to 2001, and he worked from March to December 2001 as a computer technical advisor at AM Computers in Peshawar.<sup>3</sup>

**b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** Since 1992, detainee traveled to Peshawar numerous times to visit his uncle, engineer Zalmi Bahazadah.<sup>4</sup>

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** In 2002, detainee worked part-time as a translator for DynCorp, a US/UK security contracting company supporting reconstruction activities near Kabul. Detainee worked on and off with DynCorp, picking up short-term translation assignments. On 18 October 2002, detainee started a new assignment translating technical documents for US engineers. Approximately 10 to 14 days later, detainee translated a letter of authorization for Chaman Gul, ISN US9AF-001021DP (AF-1021, transferred) another DynCorp employee tasked with escorting equipment between Herat, AF and Kabul.<sup>5</sup>

**5. (U) Capture Information:**

**a. (S//NF)** On 1 April 2003, detainee translated time-sensitive information concerning Taliban activities from three local Afghan informants. A US person overheard detainee relaying sensitive intelligence to an Afghan friend who did not have the clearance or need to know for the intelligence provided. US officials approached detainee asking why he relayed the information to his Afghan friend, which detainee denied doing. Officials accused detainee of being a spy for al-Qaida, the Taliban, or the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS). While US investigators were interviewing other personnel, detainee left the DynCorp offices with a laptop computer that he usually used at work and at home, and went home. Detainee returned four days later with his father. His father did not speak English and therefore could not plead detainee's case. On 5 April 2003, detainee was taken into custody by US personnel and taken to the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC).<sup>6</sup>

**b. (S) Property Held:**

- Sony Ericsson cell phone
- Miscellaneous personal items, including clothing and a watch

**c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 9 May 2003**

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<sup>3</sup> IIR 6 105 0891 06

<sup>4</sup> 001008 FM40 22-FEB-2005

<sup>5</sup> IIR 6 034 1006 03

<sup>6</sup> 001008 FM40 14-APR-2005, IIR 6 034 1006 03

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**d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:** To provide information on the following:

- Information concerning HIG commander Chaman Gul

**6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account:** Detainee was initially forthcoming with interrogators and provided a plausible story, but has since retracted his statements and claimed they were lies. Detainee's retractions may be either a result of pressure that AF-1021 put on him to change his story, or an indication of detainee's commitment as a HIG member. Detainee is assessed to have given sensitive information to AF-1021.

**7. (U) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer out of DoD Control:** *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would possibly seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has been mostly compliant with guard force personnel. Detainee has responded cooperatively in the past but is currently non-cooperative and may be withholding information of intelligence value. Detainee's reluctance to cooperate may show his continued support for extremist groups.* Detainee is possibly a member of the HIG. Detainee was an accomplice in an April 2003 HIG plan to use a car bomb to attack the Afghan Presidential Compound and the US Embassy in Kabul. The intent of the attack was to assassinate both the Afghani President and the US Ambassador. Detainee has ties with several high-level HIG leaders, probably indicating his own membership in the organization. Detainee collected intelligence on the security of the Afghan Presidential Compound and the US Embassy to support the operation.

- (S//NF) Detainee assisted in providing logistical assistance to a planned car bomb attack against the US Embassy and Afghan Presidential Compound.<sup>7</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee and AF-1021 worked together for a US contracting company DynCorp, which provided security at the compound that included the Afghan Presidential Palace and the US Embassy in Kabul. Detainee and AF-1021 were both recommended to DynCorp by a former DynCorp employee and suspected HIG member named Yacoub, who later worked for another US contracting company at the Kabul International Airport. Detainee stated Yacoub is a friend of AF-1021, and they

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<sup>7</sup> 001008 FM40 06-APR-2005

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had traveled together to Pakistan and Iran. Detainee claimed Yacoub and AF-1021 requested detainee perform translation work for them.<sup>8</sup>

- (C//NF) Detainee's phone book contained an entry for Yaqoob at DynCorp, along with the Thuraya satellite phone number 008821652010165.<sup>9</sup> (Analyst Note: Yaqoob is a transliteration variant for Yacoub. The Yaqoob in detainee's phone book may be the person who recommended him to DynCorp for employment.)
- (S//NF) Detainee stated HIG had been collecting intelligence on the target sites since September 2002.<sup>10</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee and AF-1021 are assessed to have sought employment at DynCorp to facilitate the HIG intelligence collection.)
  - (S//NF) Detainee admitted providing to AF-1021 US security information obtained through his employment. Detainee claimed AF-1021 was particularly interested in President Karzai's future schedule, the US Ambassador's travel times, and pictures of his security detail. However, detainee claimed not to have access to this information. Detainee eventually provided AF-1021 photographs of members of the Karzai's security detail, security procedures for Camp Aegis and Camp Serenity in Kabul, locations of the residences of members of the US Ambassador's protective detail, and the names of the Ghurka guards assigned to Camp Aegis along with their assigned weapons to include type, caliber, and serial number.<sup>11</sup> Detainee also admitted that in February 2003 he gave AF-1021 a CD containing a word processing file used to create site access badges.<sup>12</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee stated AF-1021 planned to use detainee's vehicle to transport the explosives to be used in the attack, since it entered the gate each day and would not attract suspicion.<sup>13</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee has close associations with several high-level HIG leaders, probably indicating his membership in HIG.
  - (S//NF) Detainee worked closely with AF-1021, who is a HIG commander. AF-1008 claimed AF-1021 ran a HIG intelligence collection cell, of which detainee was a member.<sup>14</sup> AF-1021's Thuraya satellite phone number was stored in the memory of detainee's cell phone when detainee was arrested.<sup>15</sup> Detainee described several of AF-1021's residences and businesses, identified where AF-1021's security guards

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<sup>8</sup> IIR 6 034 1116 03, IIR 6 034 1006 03, IIR 6 034 1290 03

<sup>9</sup> IIR 6 105 0891 06

<sup>10</sup> 001008 FM40 06-APR-2005

<sup>11</sup> IIR 6 044 6054 03

<sup>12</sup> 001008 FM40 08-MAR-2006, IIR 6 044 1528 03

<sup>13</sup> IIR 6 044 6055 03

<sup>14</sup> 001008 FM40 06-APR-2005

<sup>15</sup> IIR 6 044 7132 03

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lived, and provided details to AF-1021's hotel-restaurant in Sarubi, Kabul Province, AF.<sup>16</sup>

- (S//NF) Detainee implicated AF-1021 in the plot to attack the US Ambassador and the Afghan Presidential Compound. AF-1021 was detained based on detainee's information.
- (S//NF) Detainee's uncle, engineer Zalmi Bahazadah, may be identical to an individual known as Engineer Zalmi, who is associated with HIG intelligence. Engineer Zalmi was a former head of HIG security and was reportedly involved in the kidnapping of foreign citizens. As of September 2006, Engineer Zalmi was in charge of a HIG camp in Peshawar called Camp Shamshatu.<sup>17</sup> Engineer Zalmi was still involved in ACM activities as of late October 2008, when he was appointed as the Taliban's "shadow governor" for Lowgar Province, AF.<sup>18</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee previously stated that he visited his uncle; engineer Zalmi Bahazadah in Peshawar on several occasions.)
- (S//NF) Detainee and AF-1021 accompanied Abd al-Basir Salangi, the Kabul Chief of Police, when Salangi met the US Ambassador to Afghanistan during a ribbon cutting ceremony for the opening of a Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) center in Kabul. Detainee interpreted for the US Ambassador during the ceremony and later at a lunch with AF-1021 and Salangi. Detainee, AF-1021, and Salangi toured the rooms where the guard force protecting Afghan President Karzai would be staying. After the tour, AF-1021 and Salangi left the complex together.<sup>19</sup>
  - (S//NF) An Afghan source reported Salangi dominated the narcotics smuggling business in Kabul, and AF-1021, HIG Commander Haji Qalam, ISN US9AF-001288DP (AF-1288)<sup>20</sup>; and other HIG commanders were major players in Salangi's network. Salangi transported the narcotics to Tajikistan and Russia for sale.<sup>21</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee's resume and phone book were found in the pocket litter of Assadallah, ISN US9AF-001181DP (AF-1181, released), who was assessed to be a Taliban financier and weapons smuggler. AF-1181 was captured in September 2003, five months after detainee's arrest. The phone book contained several names similar to those of anti-Coalition militia (ACM) leaders.<sup>22</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee's relationship to Assadallah is not clear. The phone book did not contain enough information to conclusively identify the additional names with ACM leaders.)

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<sup>16</sup> IIR 6 034 1276 03, IIR 6 034 1006 03

<sup>17</sup> 20050119 ISAF LNO Report, TD-314/55248-05, IIR 6 055 1236 07, 20060920\_DAGGER\_FUSION\_CELL

<sup>18</sup> TD-314/081397-08, Analyst Note: Variants of Zalmi include Zolmi, Zulmi, Zalmay and Zalmi

<sup>19</sup> IIR 6 034 1006 03

<sup>20</sup> Analyst Note: AF-1288 is detained in Bagram, AF.

<sup>21</sup> IIR 6 044 1808 03; IIR 7 100 0739 06

<sup>22</sup> IIR 6 105 0891 06, Analyst Note: AF-1181 was detained in Bagram.

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**c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee is assessed as a **LOW** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has five reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 18 June 2008, when he was found in possession of contraband. He has one report of disciplinary infraction for assault occurring on 18 August 2003, when he threw water on the guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had no reports of disciplinary infraction and one so far in 2008.

**8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be of **LOW** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 21 November 2008.

**b. (S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee is a possible HIG member; however, there is no reporting to accurately determine his level of involvement or responsibility. Detainee provided intelligence to support an attack on the Afghan Presidential Compound and US Embassy in Kabul. Detainee had direct access to physical layouts of US facilities and probably had access to computer systems which contained security and logistical information. Detainee was in regular contact with HIG commander AF-1021, in whose intelligence collection cell detainee operated.

**c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** It remains undetermined whether detainee was a willing participant in the attack plot or was coerced by conspirators, including AF-1021. Upon capture, detainee voluntarily provided detailed information regarding his involvement in the planned operation. Based on the information detainee has already provided, his association to AF-1021 possibly extends beyond the parameters of this one planned operation. Detainee's phone book, found in AF-1181's pocket litter, is currently being exploited and may provide further insight to detainee's affiliation to ACM/HIG personnel and activities. Detainee is assessed to be only partially exploited.

**d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**

- HIG
  - Commander Chaman, AF-1021
  - Commander Qalam, AF-1288
  - Assadallah, AF-1181
  - Hekmatyar Gulbuddin
  - Engineer Zalmi Bahazadah
  - Yacoub
- ACM personnel

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- Abd al-Ahad
- Nazeer Ahmad
- Ghulam Rabani
- Ghulam Faruq
- Wahid Saraf
- Malem Saheb

9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 1 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR  
Rear Admiral, US Navy  
Commanding

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\* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.



## JTF-GTMO Assessment Afghanistan/Pakistan Detainee's

29 March 2004

**ISN: US9AF-001008DP**

**Health Assessment:** ISN 1008 has a history of latent tuberculosis, reflux, and psychosis (not otherwise specified). He is currently in good health.

**Background and Capture Data:** Detainee was an employee for DynCorp at Camp Serenity, Kabul, AF. Detainee was a translator, driver and administrative assistant and was also responsible for issuing access badges for Camp Serenity. Detainee met Commander Chaman, a HIG commander and intelligence collector, in October 2002. At the end of November 2002, Commander Chaman asked the detainee what was at Camp Serenity and what activities went on there. Detainee informed Chaman that the Karzai Protection Detail and Americans work there. Commander Chaman asked detainee to provide pictures of the camp to him, these pictures were taken at the grand opening of site one. Detainee provided Chaman with pictures of Turkish security personnel, pictures of Camp Serenity, and a computer program that contains blank access badges for Camp Serenity. Early April detainee claims that he felt he was going to get fired from his job for an incident that had taken place so detainee left DynCorp and went home. While at home detainee sought advice from his father and 05 April 2003, detainee and his went back to detainee's office at Camp Serenity and tried to explain his actions, subsequently, detainee was arrested and his father was unable to plead his son's case because he did not speak English. The 20

**Risk Assessment:** the detainee is now telling a completely different story in which he denies any involvement with Commander Chaman. It is assessed that Chaman has threatened detainee and that is why his story has changed. Detainee was subsequently transported to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba on 08 May 2003 because of his knowledge of HIG Commander Chaman. 5 April 2003 Medium

original story is correct and the he provided information on Camp Serenity to HIG Commander Chaman. Due to his incarceration detainee is, or may be vulnerable to recruitment for terrorist or supportive groups. Detainee may have been cooperative, but his veracity is questioned. It is assessed that the detainee has had associations with known terrorist organizations or supporters.

**Intelligence Value: Fully Exploited**

**Exploitation Requirements:** None

**Recommendation:** Transfer to the Control of Another Country for Continued Detention.

**Date of Capture:**

**Risk Level:**

**CLASSIFIED BY:** Multiple Sources

**REASON:** E.O. 12958 Section 1.5(C)

**DECLASSIFY ON:** 20290403